The Vietnam War

A Report By: Nathan C. Lee

The Vietnam War has been a dark shadow in American military history, and in this
report I hope to shed some light on this highly controversial subject and what really
happened there. However, to understand American involvement you must examine the
past events in Vietnam which brought the awesome power of the American military
there. For hundreds of years the Vietnamese people have fought off invaders, before the
outbreak of World War II the Vietnamese fought off numerous invasions by the Chinese,
during World War II the Vietnamese fought the Japanese Imperialist Army.

Shortly after the end of World War II the French sent its troops into Indochina
(Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, etc....) to take back control of its colony. Shortly after the
Viet Minh, the Vietnamese resistance group led by Ho Chi Minh, took up arms against
the French. In July 1954, Viet Minh forces attacked the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu.
After days of intensive and bloody battle, the French base perimeter was shrunk down to
a baseball field size perimeter. Shortly after, the French surrendered at Dien Bien Phu and
thousands of French troops were taken prisoner. This battle showed the French that after
more then one hundred years, they could no longer control this colony. In the summer of
1954, the French signed the Geneva Peace Accords. Drawn up in the shadow of the
Korean War, the Geneva Peace Accords represented the worst of all possible futures for
war-torn Vietnam and reflected the strains of the international Cold War.

The Geneva Agreement established a provisional military demarcation line at the
17th parallel, and empowered the two Vietnamese “parties” (later to be called North and
South Vietnam) to administer their zones of control, and called for “general elections
which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam” in July 1956. The representatives of
the United States and of the state of Vietnam (later to be called South Vietnam) refused to
sign the agreement on the terms that general elections could not be held fairly in the
Communist controlled state of North Vietnam.

The negotiations surrounding the Geneva Agreement also prompted the United States
to take the lead in forming a regional collective security pact “to deter and if necessary
combat communist aggression.” The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was
organized in Manila in September 1954, and placed South Vietnam under its protection.
A month earlier the SEATO Treaty was debated in the US National Security Council
where Secretary of the State John Foster Dulles explained that a “line against aggression”
needed to be drawn “to include Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam on our side.”

In October 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began to provide military aid to
South Vietnam, and in February 1955 US military advisers arrived in South Vietnam to
train the South Vietnamese military in tactics and weapon usage. In 1956, Ngo Dinh
Diem, a staunchly anti-Communist figure from the South, won a dubious election that
made him President of South Vietnam. Shortly after his election, Diem claimed that his
new government was under attack by the communists. In late 1957, with American
military aid, Diem began to counter attack. Diem used the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to identify those who sought to bring down his government and arrested thousands.
The out cry against Diem was enormous. On December 20th, 1960, the National
Liberation Front (NLF) was born. The NLF or “Viet Cong” (Viet Cong is Vietnamese for
Vietnamese Communist) used violent opposition against the South Vietnamese people
and against the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy sent a team to Vietnam to report on the
conditions in the South and to assess future American aid requirements. The report now
known as the “December 1961 White Paper,” argued for an increase in military,
technical, and economic aid, and the introduction of large-scale American advisers to
help stabilize the Diem regime and crush the National Liberation Front. In typical
Kennedy fashion, the president chose the middle route. The United States would increase
the level of its military involvement in South Vietnam through more machinery and
advisers, but would not intervene whole-scale with troops.

On January 2nd, 1963, at Ap Bac on the Plains of Reeds southwest of Saigon, a Viet
Cong battalion of about 320 men inflicted heavy damage on an ARVN force of 3,000
equipped with troop-carrying helicopters, new UH-1 (“Huey”) helicopter gunships,
tactical bombers, and APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers). Ap Bac represented a
leadership failure for the ARVN and a major moral boost for the anti government forces.
The absence of fighting spirit in the ARVN mirrored the continued inability of the Saigon
regime to win political support.

In the summer of 1963, because of the NLF successes and its own failures, it was
clear that the South Vietnamese Government was on the verge of political collapse.
Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had raided the Buddhist pagodas of South Vietnam,
claiming that they had harbored the communists that were creating the instability. The
result was massive protests on the streets of Saigon that led Buddhist monks to self-
immolation. The pictures of monks engulfed in flames made world headlines and caused
considerable consternation in Washington. By late September the Buddhist protests had
created such dislocation in the south that the Kennedy administration supported a coup.

In 1963, some of Diem’s own generals in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) approached the American Embassy in Saigon with plans to overthrow Diem.
With Washington’s tacit approval, on November 1st, 1963, Diem and his brother were
captured and later killed. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated on the
streets of Dallas.

On the afternoon of August 2nd, 1964, the US navy destroyer USS Maddox (DD-
731), on what was called a DeSoto patrol, was gathering various information, including
electronics intelligence about coastal radar defenses, and signal intelligence from
intercepted radio messages. North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the USS Maddox,
unsuccessfully, near an island that had been shelled in an OPLAN (Operations Plan) 34A
raid three nights before. US aircraft briefly pursued the retreating torpedo boats
attempting to sink them, but otherwise there was no retaliation. A second incident was
reported on the night of August 4th. The men on the destroyer USS C. Turner Joy (DD-
951) who described torpedo boats attacking them certainly believed it at the time. Many
later decided they had been shooting at ghost images on their radar. Many others who
were there, and some later historians believed there was a genuine attack. The
preponderance of the available evidence indicates there was no attack.

In retaliation for the supposed second attack, US aircraft attacked North Vietnamese
naval vessels at several locations along the coast August 5th, plus a fuel storage facility at
Vinh. On August 7th, the House of Representatives passed 416-0, and the Senate 98-2,
the so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving President Lyndon B. Johnson a blank check
for further military action in Vietnam.

The buildup of formal US military units had begun on March 8th, 1965, when two
battalions of US Marines made an amphibious assault landing on the beaches of Da
Nang. The US Marines took the beach with little resistance. In June, Marine and Army
units began offensive unit operations- “search and destroy” missions. On July 28th,
Johnson announced that 50,000 US troops would go to South Vietnam immediately. By
the end of the year, there were 184,300 US personnel in South Vietnam.

The escalation of the ground and air war in 1965 provoked Hanoi to begin deploying
in the South increasing units of the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In October,
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the NVA commander, launched a major offensive in the Central
Highlands, southwest of Pleiku. General William C. Westmoreland responded by
ordering the US Army’s most mobile unit, the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), into
the Central Highlands. Through much of November, in the battle of the Ia Drang Valley,
US and North Vietnamese forces engaged each other for the first time in heavy combat.
The Americans ultimately forced the NVA out of the valley and killed ten times as many
enemy soldiers as they lost. Westmoreland used helicopters extensively for troop
movements, re-supply, medical evaluation, and tactical air support. The battle convinced
US commanders that “search and destroy” tactics using air mobility would work in
accomplishing the attrition strategy.

During 1966 Westmoreland requested more ground troops, and by the years end the
US ground force level “in country” reached 385,000. They were organized into seven
divisions and other specialized airborne, armored, Special Forces, and logistical units.
With US aid, the ARVN also expanded to eleven divisions, supplemented by local and
irregular units. The MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) was getting men
and munitions in place for large-unit search and destroy operations. Army and Marine
units conducted smaller operations. Although the “body count” -the estimated number of
enemy killed- mounted, attrition was not changing the political equation in South
Vietnam. Even though the NLF lost more and more men, the Viet Cong guerrillas kept a
strong presence in certain areas. The VC would often disappear when US forces entered
an area, and quickly reappear when the Americans left.

Beginning in 1967, General Westmoreland made his big push to win the war. Most
South Vietnamese military forces were primarily assigned to occupation, pacification,
and security duties. This was also the beginning of massive US combat sweeps moved to
locate and destroy the enemy. In January, Operation Cedar Falls began which was a
30,000-man assault on an enemy stronghold known as the Iron Triangle, an enemy base
area forty miles north of Saigon. Starting in February and lasting through April,
Operation Junction City was an even larger assault on nearby War Zone C. There was
also major fighting in the Central Highlands, in November there was the Battle of Dak To
in which 285 US soldiers were killed in almost three weeks of fighting in the Kontum
province. More then 1,400 NVA were killed in the battle. MACV declared vast areas to
be “free-fire zones,” which meant that U.S. and ARVN artillery and tactical aircraft, as
well as B-52 “carpet bombing,” could target anyone or anything in the area.

Late in 1967, with 485,600 troops in Vietnam, Westmoreland announced that,
although much fighting remained, a cross-over point had arrived in the war; that is, the
losses to the NVA and Viet Cong were greater than they could possibly replace. Despite
incredible losses, the Viet Cong still controlled many areas.

The decisive year was 1968. In the early morning of January 30th, the Viet Cong
launched a series of attacks (called the Tet Offensive) on South Vietnamese cities and
military installations. Named after the holiday in which the Vietnamese celebrate the
Lunar New Year. Two of the most famous battles that took place were the battles for
Saigon and Hué city. At about 0300 hours (3 a.m.), on January 31st, just as the last volley
of Tet celebratory fireworks was set off, a variety of targets were attacked in and around
Saigon: air bases, southern military and police headquarters, US military command and
billeting facilities, and television and radio stations. Although communist forces had
tipped their hand by mistakenly attacking Hué and other cities to the north of Saigon on
January 30th, Americans were shocked by the realization that about 4,000 VC could
infiltrate the capitol and launch vicious attacks.

The most spectacular engagement in Saigon occurred when the Viet Cong C-10
Sapper Battalion penetrated the US Embassy compound, prompting a desperate shootout
with security guards and embassy staff. The VC were cleared from the embassy grounds
by 0900 hours (9 a.m.), but American reporters, who had witnessed the fight were
shocked by Gen. Westmoreland’s assertion that this was a VC publicity stunt and
militarily meaningless. The American public was also shocked by the television, film,
and still photographs of the summary street execution of a VC commando who murdered
a South Vietnamese police officer and his family. The photos were taken by Nguyen
Ngoc Loan, the South Vietnamese chief of Saigon’s security forces. Westmoreland’s
prediction was accurate militarily; within forty-eight hours, allied forces in Saigon were
hunting down the VC, and by February 16th, the battle for Saigon was over.

The battle to control Hué had begun January 31st, at 0340 hours. The American
soldiers in the MACV compound in the new City, although taken by surprise, managed to
fight off the 804th Battalion, NVA 4th Regiment, and held their positions. However, in
the Old City, the elite ARVN ‘Hac Bo’ (Black Panther) Recondo Company was not so
fortunate. Faced with the combined strength of the 800th and 802nd Battalions, NVA 6th
Regiment, along with the VC 12th Sapper Battalion, it was forced back by the ARVN 1st
Division HQ. The NVA 806th and 810th Battalions then took up blocking positions north
and south of Hué respectively.

Although early attempts by elements of the 1st and 5th Marines to enter the city
failed, counter-attacks began in earnest in the Old City on February 1st, and in the New
City three days later, when three more Marine rifle companies joined the battle. To the
west of the city, the 3d Brigade, 1st Air cavalry, prevented the infiltration of three fresh
NVA Regiments.

Although ‘Ontos’ -tracked vehicles mounting batteries of six 106mm recoilless
rifles- proved effective, a reluctance to use heavy weapons in the ancient city forced the
Marines to put up their own covering fire as they fought from house to house. However,
when supporting fire from naval gunships was authorized on February 5th, and artillery
and air support on February 7th, the course of the battle changed dramatically. The US
barrage was immense, with 5,191 naval rounds, 18,091 artillery rounds, and 290,877 lb.
of aerial ordnance being expanded.

The new city was cleared by February 9th, and the use of 250 lb. “Snakeye” bombs
and 500 lb. napalm canisters enabled the ARVN and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, to
breach the Citadel walls on February 22nd. Hué was declared secure three days later, at a
cost of 3,228 allied casualties, including 357 ARVN, and 142 Marines dead. The NVA
lost 4601 dead and 45 captured.

Also during the Tet Offensive was the siege of Khe Sanh. In prelude to the Khe Sanh
siege, increasing numbers of Hanoi’s troops were detected in the vicinity of the combat
base. By January 1968, the combat base was manned by 6,806 American troops
(including 5,905 US Marines) under Col. David E. Lownds. There were an estimated
25,000-40,000 North Vietnamese in the area.

The events of the seventy-eight day siege began with an attack on an out lining
position (Hill 861) and January 20th-21st 1968, coupled with the bombardment of the
main base that destroyed much of the Marines’ reserve ammunition. The force at Khe
Sanh village withstood an attack the next night but was then withdrawn. There were
several pitched battles for outposts but no more than probes at the combat base. These
include the battles at Hill 861A (February 5th), Lang Vei (February 7th), and Hill 64
(February 8th). All the posts except Lang Vei were successfully defended. On February
21st, there was a probe against South Vietnamese ranger positions in the main base. The
base and its outposts were heavily supported throughout the siege by US airpower and
artillery fire in an exceptional effort that General Westmoreland called Operation
Niagara. It remains unclear whether the lack of a big North Vietnamese attack was
intentional or resulted from losses inflicted by this firepower. Khe Sanh was relived by an
overland attack, Operation Pegasus, involving some 30,000 troops that made contact with
the isolated base on April 7th, 1968. After a period of mobile action, the United States
withdrew from Khe Sanh on July 6th, 1968.

Official US figures for casualties, which included several sources of losses, amount to
205 killed and 816 wounded who were evacuated; a more detailed assessment indicated
about 730 battle deaths, 2,598 wounded, and 7 missing. Losses during the periods of
mobile operations in the surrounding zone include another 326 killed, 1,888 wounded,
and 3 missing. North Vietnamese losses have been estimated by Americans at between
10,000 and 15,000 dead alone.

Meanwhile, combat raged in South Vietnam. Over 14,000 American were killed in
action in Vietnam in 1968, the highest annual US death toll of the war. The worst US war
crime of the conflict occurred on March 16th, 1968 (although not revealed in the press
until November 6th, 1969) when American infantrymen massacred some 500 unresisting
civilians, including babies, in the village if My Lai. In April and May 1968 the largest
ground operation of the war, with 110,000 US and ARVN troops, targeted Viet Cong and
NVA forces near Saigon. Peace talks began in Paris on May 13th, 1968, but immediately
deadlocked. On June 10th, 1968, General Creighton Abrams succeeded Westmoreland as
MACV commander. In the fall Abrams began to shift US strategy from attrition to a
greater emphasis on combined operations, pacification area security, and what was called
“Vietnamization,” that is, preparing the ARVN to do more of the fighting.

When Richard M. Nixon became president in 1969, the US war effort was still
massive; the basic decision to de-escalate had already been reached. With the ground war
at a stalemate, the Nixon administration turned increasingly to air bombardment and
secretly expanded the air war into neutral Cambodia. The White House announced the
first withdrawal of 25,000 US ground troops and heralded Vietnamization as effective.
To bolster the South, the administration leaked to the press dire threats of a “go for
broke” air and naval assault on the North -possibly including nuclear weapons.

The moral and discipline of US troops declined in 1969 as the futility of the ground
war and the beginnings of US withdrawal became more obvious. After the intense ten-
day battle in May, infantrymen of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) took a ridge
in the A Shau Valley that they dubbed Hamburger Hill.

One of the bloodiest and most followed military battles of the Vietnam War, the
Battle of Âp Bia Mountain occurred as part of Operation Apache Snow. It was fought
against entrenched North Vietnamese Army regulars who, as they

For ten days in May 10th-20th, 1969, units of the 101st US Airborne Division and the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) attacked North Vietnamese Army units dug in
on a mountain called Dong Ap Bia (Hill 937), in the A Shau Valley, Thua Thien Province
-part of I Corps Tactical Zone in northernmost South Vietnam. Heavy losses among all
combatants gave the mountain a new name: Hamburger Hill.

Long the scene of fierce battles between US and their South Vietnamese allies and
North Vietnamese forces, the A Shau closely parallels the Vietnamese - Laos border.
This made it easy for North Vietnamese units to cross from their Laotian sanctuary, lure
allied units into battle, inflict heavy casualties, then vanish into sanctuary. On Hamburger
Hill (Hill 937), the North Vietnamese strategy was again effective: 56 Americans died,
and 420 were wounded; South Vietnamese losses were also high. An estimated 600 North
Vietnamese soldiers died and many more were wounded. Over 270 close air support
sorties and 22,000 rounds of artillery were delivered to support a poorly coordinated
piecemeal ground assault by about ten battalions -four of them U.S. Both sides
abandoned the fight -and the hill.

Faced with mounting public dissatisfaction, the slow pace of Vietnamization, and
diplomatic frustration, Nixon boldly sent U.S. units into Cambodia in April 1970. U.S.
leaders had long complained about the sanctuary that neutral Cambodia provided Viet
Cong and NVA units. This Cambodian incursion lasted until the end of June and
provided some tactical gains, but it also sparked controversy and demonstrations by the
Vietnam antiwar movement in the United States over what seemed an expansion of the
war to another country. U.S. troop reductions continued with only 334,600 in the South
as 1970 ended.

In 1970, Nixon continued with reducing troop sizes in Vietnam, leaving only 156,000
by the end of December. To help support Vietnamization, heavy U.S. air attacks
continued against Communist supply lines in Laos and Cambodia, and so-called
protective-reaction strikes hit military targets north of the Demilitarized Zone and near
Hanoi and its port city of Haiphong. Tactical air support continued, with the heaviest
coming in March during a South Vietnamese assault into Laos. Code named “Lam Son
719,” this operation ended in a confused retreat by the ARVN that further sullied the
motion of Vietnamization.

Authorized on January 18th, 1971, Lam Son 719 took its name from the site of a
Vietnamese victory over the Chinese in 1427. Its objective was to drive a 15-mile wide
corridor to Tchepone, 22 miles inside Laos along Route 9 and a strategic junction on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. Phase One began on January 30th, securing Route 9 inside South
Vietnam and re-establishing Khe Sanh as a logistic base. On February 8th, Phase Two
saw 12,000 ARVN troops, commanded by Lieutenant-General Hoang Xuan Lam, strike
into Laos. The ARVN 1st Armored Brigade moved along Route 9, while airborne troops
and Rangers secured firebases on the hills to the north. The advance went well until
heavy NVA counter-attacks developed from the north on February 12th. Ranger firebases
became untenable by February 22, and the Airborne Division was also forced out of its
positions by PT-76 and T-54 tanks.

Xuam Lam changed his original plans and the 1st Infantry Division was lifted in a
series of bounds along the escarpment. Two battalions were flown direct from Khe Sanh
to size Tchepone on March 6th: it was the longest-range heliborne assault of the war.
Phase three had been intended as a lengthy clearing operation but, suffering heavily, Lam
ordered withdrawal (Phase Four) on March 10th. It turned into a rout, with only U.S.
airpower saving the ARVN from extinction. It was all over by March 24th, with ARVN
casualties estimated at nearly 10,000 -nearly 50 percent of the total committed to Laos.
The Americans, who had been confined to a supporting role, had lost 107 helicopters and
176 aircrew.

In 1972 Nixon traveled to China and the USSR in diplomatic initiatives, trying to
isolate Hanoi from its suppliers. With the shrinking American forces nearing 100,000
(only a small portion being combat troops), General Giap launched a spring 1972
offensive by Communist forces against the northern provinces of South Vietnam, the
Central Highlands, and provinces northwest of Saigon. In most of the battles, the ARVN
was saved by massive B-52 bombing. Nixon also launched the heavy bombers against
North Vietnam itself in a campaign called Linebacker, and the United States mined the
harbor at Haiphong. Over the course of the war, total U.S. bombing tonnage far exceeded
that dropped on Germany, Italy, and Japan in World War II.

Wearied by the latest round of fighting, the United States and North Vietnamese
governments, agreed in October on a cease-fire, return of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs),
at least the temporary continuation of Thieu’s government, and, most controversially,
permission for NVA troops remain in the south. Objections from Thieu’s government
caused Nixon to hesitate, which in turn led Hanoi to harden its position. In December, the
United States hit North Vietnam again with repeated B-52 attacks, codenamed
Linebacker II and labeled the Christmas Bombings by journalists. On January 27th, 1973,
the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government representing the NLF signed the Paris Peace Agreement Ending the War and
Restoring Peace in Vietnam, which basically confirmed the October terms.

By April 1st, 1973, U.S. forces were out of Vietnam (except for a few embassy
guards and attaches) and 587 POWs were returned to the United States by Hanoi in
Operation Homecoming (about 2,500 other Americans remained missing in action).
Congress cut off funds for the air war in Cambodia, and bombing there ended in August.
Over Nixon’s veto, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in November 1973. It
limited presidential power to deploy U.S. forces in hostile action without congressional
approval.

Nixon characterized the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973 as “Peace with Honor,” but
primarily they allowed the U.S. military to leave Vietnam without resolving the issue of
the country’s political future. Without U.S. air and ground support, South Vietnam’s
military defenses steadily deteriorated. In the spring of 1975, an NVA thrust into the
Central Highlands turned into an ARVN rout. On April 30th, as NVA and Viet Cong
soldiers entered the city of Saigon, the last remaining Americans abandoned the U.S.
embassy in Saigon in a dramatic rooftop evacuation by helicopters.

I believe that United States military was in the country of Vietnam to prevent the
spread of Communism and to protect a country that was under attack because they didn’t
believe and didn’t want to have Communist ideals. Proof of this was the vast amount of
refugees who fled south when Vietnam was split into north and south. After the fall of
Saigon the vast amount of Vietnamese people who took to the open seas in any kind of
boat they could find trying to make it to America or any other country where communism
wouldn’t deny them of there basic freedom. As for the reporters who were reporting the
war in Vietnam, I think they did the worst job of reporting in history, many times on the
news you would only hear of what we did wrong, instead of what was done right, or the
good things our soldiers were doing in South Vietnam. I also have a strong feelings
towards the draft dodgers and college students who protested the war, they had no idea
what was going on over there, most of them were from rich families and been sheltered
from events of the out sided world. I don’t think the draft dodgers should have been let
off for dodging the draft, so many men gave the ultimate sacrifice when its country called
upon them for their service, and these individuals fled to Canada, Mexico, or any other
country where they could have asylum from the draft. The worst moment of all these
events I feel is when the actress Jane Fonda (who was openly against the war) took a trip
to North Vietnam and had her picture taken in the seat of an anti-aircraft gun and
denounced the US position, and claimed that all US troops were guilty of war crimes.

Another person who I feel should have been prosecuted for his participation with the
North Vietnamese is Lt. John Kerry. In April 1971, while still a member of the US armed
forces, Lt. Kerry arranged a secret meeting with North Vietnamese and communist
leaders in Paris. Over these couple days they discussed how to help end the war quicker.
After this secret meeting with communist officials, John Kerry came back to the US, with
assistance from the VVAW (Vietnam Veterans against the War), lied to members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lt.Kerry and several other members of the VVAW
made accusations that US forces “…personally raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, taped
wired from portable telephones to human genitals and turned up the power, cut off limbs,
blown up bodies, randomly shot at civilians, razed villages in fashion reminiscent of
Genghis Khan, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stock, and generally ravaged
the country side of South Vietnam, in addition too the normal ravage of war, and the
normal and very particular ravaging which is done by the applied bombing power of this
country.” After giving this statement on behalf of the VVAW, there was an investigation
into these claims made by the VVAW, and many of the members of this organization;
most of which made these accusations; were found to have never served in the US
military, or even stepped into Vietnamese soil.

U.S. Military Service and Casualties in the Vietnam War (1964-1973)

*826 U.S. servicemen were captured in Vietnam (114 died in captivity), and as of September 1993, 2,489 were listed as missing in action.

Bibliogrophy

2. Nam: The Vietnam Experience 1965-75
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1995

3. Pimlott, John. Vietnam: Decisive Battles
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1999

4. Aaron R. Murray. Vietnam War: Battles and Leaders
DK Publishing, Inc., 2004

5. Leo J. Daugherty & Gregory L. Mattson, Nam: A Photographic History
Barnes & Nobles, Inc., 2001

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Copyright© 2005 - Email: Nathan C. Lee